Intrahousehold inequality and the theory of targeting by Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi
*  $i












Hlere is  a  start  at  l1nking  the  literatures  on taroetino anzd  on
illtraho0l.lehold  IneIualiy  lsZ  V  h  iih  hav e  developed  fpidlv  hutll
largely independent of each other.
.Lho(x..r4$-r :c L,  ;F  I  . JE:c8!  I;J.,  4U  4 *.  *'.  :  -.  r dI\c.  :N  _  :  .- 'v  :  ..  . ]
Lhad  _' Os,-L.C.:tJ'  'wtr>  . II'  '"  .. I.:  *x'  ... Qdt.i  :.~.C.Cc  . ( . '.:2'F  I  ..  *2S7
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and External  Affairs
Development  Economics
WPS 789
'I'llis  papker  It product  ol' die  Research  Advisory  Staff', Oilice  of  Ilhc Vice  Prcsidcit,  Development
lcnnormi%s - is part ot  a largcr  cl'lort  in PRE  to understand  the  design  of poverty  alleviation  policies.
Copies are availablM frce fIrom  the  XVorl'J  Biank 1818  If  Street NW  WaW  hington  D)C  20433.  Please coiltact
Janc SweenC\,  rk,om S3-026,  extension  310(21  (13 pages).  October  1991.
Th,c  te.o  1 ltCatiufcs  oll  la!tlgt  inand  on  intrahiouseihold  inequality  anid allocation  mecha-
initrahousehold  incqualit\  liavc  developcd  rapidly  nisms  could  affcet  the standard  analysis  of'
oVkc,  the pa>  13  I  *  cars,  but la  Rcl\  independent  of  targeting  theory.  Thex coniclude with a list of
each  other.  policy  questions  for further  rcsearcih  including
the  following:
T'hc literature  on waroetino concerns  itself'
;  ilt)h Il  desi  Ln  of  t.1a  dld  tranlslfcr  puitgi  slwl  *  M  iOW are  coiincut  ional  rules  lor indicator
pmo  eny  alleviation  in the presence  of'limitcd  targeting  modif'ied  by different  housciold
in  tlormiation  on  l  lho  the  poor  are.  allocatioIn  mnechanisms.
'I'lTh  literaturc  oii intrahouschold  inequ al  ity  *  How  far v"  roing can onlC  go  in targetinlg by
arosc out ot a dissailst  clion  wnitih  "unilar''  simpl)  assumiing that  int-ahouseihold  inequality
modf,ls  otheiC  houschol(j.  es.plecially  in  explain-  does  n0ot  exist,  when  in  fact  it  does?'
ill_  ilkqUlid  t  in  consumtipion  and  achievements
of (difteellt  household mriembcrs,  even al;ter  *  What sort of  intrahouscihold  inlonnation
allou. i r  tor reie\ adi  illerences a.imolln  tleilm.  s,tould bc collected  to best aid tareeting?
Iladdad  and  Kanhur  hbein io tforge  ihe link  *  f-lo%  do the  "bargaining"  versus the  "com-
hetu.cen  the  tvo  literattu-es,  so thex  canl address  mon prefcrence"  views  of tfhe  liousciold irillu-
issues  policxmakeurs face around  iltle  u.old,  encc our  evaluation  of  alternative  transfer
Alter  a hrief  reprise  of ilic key  featurcs  of thc  prograrms?
t\ko  litclrture.u  tilc  indicale  ho%  tile  pilesence  ol'
I11<1[iSl  \\,  'i,}  . I' 1  l'l  S, t  ;.  :.  ":.,..  1:t'  tl'i2u:1,wl>.  c 1 kertk un,Lr  y  '\  '! I iI3. tld1k '. jlii  . Rcxr.tr 'e (in~t7  f\WflUi,
'c p'llvi,  tit  no:  flCk c-.I!i\  o1h  c''n  j'  ii  H.,i~k poli
Pict  .:-  .! 1,%  tl:, I'R  L Di;senn;:m.,r-. Cc fitcrINTRAHOUSEHOLD  INEQUALITY  AND  THE  THEORY  OF  TARGETING*
CONTENTS
1.  INTRODUCTION  ........... 1. 
2.  INTRAHOUSEHOLD  ALLOCATION  AND  INEQUALITY  . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  TARGETING  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.  INDICATOR  TARGETING  AND  INTRAHOUSEHOLD  ALLOCATION  . . . . . . 6
5.  SELF-TARGETING  MECHANISMS  AND  INTRAHOUSEHOLD  BARGAINiING  . . . 8
6.  FURTHER  RESEARCH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
*  Invited  paper  for  presentation  at  the  Sixth  Annual  Congress  of  the
European  Economic  Association,  Cambridge,  England,  September  1991.INTRAHOUSEHOLD  INEQUALITY  AND  THE  THEORY  OF  TARGETING
1.  INTRODUCTION
The  two  literatures  on  targeting  and  on  intrahousehold  inequality
have  developed  rapidly  over  the  past  15  years,  but  largely
independently  of  each  other. The  literature  on  targeting  goes  back  at
least  as  far  as  Akerlof  (1979),  and  has  concerned  itself  with  the
design  of  tax  and  transfer  programs  for  poverty  alleviation  in  the
presence  of  limited  information  on  who  the  poor  are. The  origins  of
the  literature  on  intrahousehold  inequality  are  referred  to  in  Sen
(1984).  This  literature  arose  out  of  a  dissatisfaction  with  "unitary"
models  of  the  household,  especially  in  explaining  observed  inequality
in  consumption  and  achievements  of  different  household  members,  even
after  making  an  allowance  for  relevant  differences  among  them.
While  the  two  academic  literatures  have  indeed  been  mostly
innocent  of  each  other,  the  significance  of  intrahousehold  inequality
and  allocation  for  targeting  has  not  escaped  the  notice  of
policymakers.  In  developed  countries,  the  debate  on  whether  child
benefit  should  be  paid  to  the  mother  at  a  welfare  office,  or  to  the
father's  paycheck  through  a  tax  exemption,  has  essentially  been  about
the  perceived  allocation,  and  reallocation,  of  intrahousehold
resources.  Similarly,  the  discussion  in  developing  countries  about
knock  on  effects  of  supplementary  feeding  programs  for  children,  and-2-
for  pregnant  and  lactating  women,  is  essentially  one  about  whether  or
not  extra  calories  at  the  feeding  station  means  fewer  calories
received  by  the  individual  at  home.
The  object  of  this  paper  is  to  begin  the  task  of  forging  a link
between  the  two  analytical  literatures  on  targeting  and  on
intrahousehold  inequality,  so  that  they  are  better  able  to  address
issues  faced  in  this  area  by  policymakers  in  developed  and  developing
countries.  After  a  brief  reprise  of  the  key  features  of  the  two
literatures  in  Sections  2  and  3,  Sections  4  and  5  will  indicate  how
the  presence  of  intrahousehold  inequality  and  allocation  mechanisms
could  affect  the  standard  analysis  of  targeting  theory,  Section  6
concludes  with  a  list  of  topics  for  further  research.
2.  INTRAHOUSEHOLD  ALLOCATION  AND  INEQUALITY
Are  similar  individuals  treated  dissimilarly  in  the  allocation  of
consumption  within  a  household?  The  answer  from  the  empirical
literature  is  that  this  possibility  has  to  be  taken  seriously.  Sen
(1984)  summarizes  a  number  of  studies  on  outcome  variables  which  argue
that  girls  within  households  are  discriminated  relative  to  boys.
Harriss  (1986)  presents  at  least  some  evidence  of  calorie  intake
inequality.  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990a)  shew  that  standard  measures  of
inequality  in  calorie  adequacy  would  be  understated  by  30  to  40
percent  if  intrahousehold  inequality  was  ignored.
But  is  the  above  sufficient  evidence  that  similar  individuals  are
being  treated  dissimilarly?  If  individuals  differ  in  their-3-
produdltiviiies,  Lieri  exArd  caiories  may weili  De callea  tor  as  an
income  generation  device  for  the  household  as  a  whole  (Pitt,
Rosenzweig,  and  Hassan  1990).  Even  a  household  that  was  egalitarian
in  terms  of  its  welfare  functicn  might  allocate  calories  unequally.
While  there  are  some  tests  of  the  degree  of  inequality  aversion
displayed  by  a  household  welfare  function,  as  revealed  by  consumption
allocation  and  other  outcomes  (Behrman  and  Deolalikar  1989),  a  major
debate  in  the  literature  is  on  whether  such  a "common  preference"
model  is  valid.  An  alternative  is  a  view  of  the  outcomes  as  being
determined  by  intrahousehold  bargaining.  The  empirical  implications
of  this  for  demand  theory  are  laid  out  by  McElroy  (1990),  who  makes
clear  that  the  difference  between  the  common  preference  and  bargaining
approaches  can  be  traced  to  the  fact  that,  in  the  latter,  changes  in
the  external  environment  can  alter  the  "threat  points"  and  lead  to
reallocations  that  are  different  from  those  predicted  by  the  household
wel-are  maximizing  model.
Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990b)  have  considered  the  predictions  of  the
bargaining  model  on  intrahousehold  inequality  as  the  household  gets
better  ott. they  find  that  the  net  effect  depends  on  a  subtle
interaction  between  changes  in  the  gains  from  cooperation  and  in  the
threat  points.  Under  certain  conditions,  intrahousehold  inequality
can  first  increase  and  then  decrease,  thus  tracing  out  a "Kuznets
curve."  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990c)  find  empirical  evidence  for  such  a
relationship  for  data  from  the  Philippines.  Thomas  (1990)  and
Altonji,  Hayashi,  and  Kotlikoff  (1990)  are  among  the  authors  who  find-4-
evidence  that  is  not  supportive  of  the  common  preference  model.  As  we
shall  see,  this  finding  is  of  some  significance  for  targeting  of
poverty  alleviation  programs.
3.  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  TARGETING
Besley  and  Kanbur  (1988)  have  considered  the  principles  of
targeting  that  underlie  the  literature  emanating  from  Akerlof  (1978).
The  theory  of  targeting  concerns  itself  with  the  design  of  transfer
mechanisms  for  alleviating  poverty.  Given  a  pre-intervention
distribution  of  income  and  a  poverty  line,  an  ideal  solution  nmight  be
characterized  as  being  one  where  sufficient  income  is  transferred  to
the  poor  to  bring  them  just  up  to  the  poverty  line. There  are,
however,  at  least  two  problems  with  the  ideal  solution.  First,  since
transfers  fall  one-to-one  with  income,  it  entails  an  effective
marginal  tax  rate  on  the  poor  of  100  percent.  This  is  bound  to  have
incentive  effects-Kanbur,  Keen,  and  Tuomala  (1991)  give  a
quantitative  feel  for  the  consequences.  Second,  it  requires  that  the
policymaker  has  quite  detailed  information  on  individuals,  making  it
possible  to  exclude  those  above  the  poverty  line,  and  to  ta,lor  the
magnitude  of  the  transfer  quite  finely  to  those  below  the  poverty
line. Such  detailed  information,  and  the  administrative  ability  to
use  it,  is  simply  not  present  in  most  developing  countries,  and,  in
certain  contexts,  in  developed  countries  as  well.
In  view  of  this  second  problem,  Besley  and  Kanbur  (1988)
characterize  two  types  of  targeting  mechanisms-indicator  targeting-5-
apd  self-targeting.  Indicator  targeting  relies  on  making  the  transfer
contingent  not  on  income  or  consumption,  but  some  easily  observable
characteristic,  such  as  sex,  age,  landholding,  region  of  residence,
etc. Akerlof  (1978)  referred  to  this  as  "tagging."  As  he  shows,  this
extra  information  is  bound  to  be  useful.  Kanbur  (1987)  and  Kanbur  and
Keen  (1989)  derive  optimal  rules  for  contingent  transfers,  while
Ravallion  (1989)  quantifies  the  gain  from  using  this  information.
Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1991a)  develop  the  theory  of  "upper-limit  indicator
targeting,"  where  an  upper  cutoff  of  an  observable  variable,  such  as
age,  is  used  to  determine  eligibility  in  transfer  programs  (e.g.,
supplementary  feeding).
Self-targeting  mechanisms  rely  on  an  announced  scheme  that
permits  unlimited  participation,  but  is  designed  in  such  a  way  that
only  members  of  the  target  group  find  it  worthwhile  to  participate.
Thus,  costly  administrative  screening  and  verification  of  indicators,
etc.,  is  not  necessary-the  incentives  to  participate  are  themselves
the  screen.  Such  "self-screening"  or  "self-selection"  has  been
analyzed  in  the  recent  theoretical  literature  on  imperfect  information
(e.g.,  Hoff  and  Stiglitz  1990),  but  the  mechanisms  themselves  were
well  known,  for  example,  to  those  who  designed  the  Indian  famine  codes
in  the  19th  century  (Dr6ze  1988).
The  basic  idea  is  to  impose  a  cost  of  participation  that  varies
directly  with  pre-intervention  income.  The  best  known  illustration  of
such  a  scheme  is  the  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  (EGS)  in  tne  state  of
Maharashtra  in  India  (Ravallion  1991).  This  scheme,  and  others,  rely-6-
on  ofi¢;10  ni  un.  -I  m..tcj  n 'LI  , but  at  d  Waye low  enough  to  attract
only  those  with  low  pre-intervention  incomes.  Ravallion  (1989)
presents  a  theoretical  analysis  of  such  schemes,  while  Ravallion
(1991)  surveys  some  of  the  empirical  evidence,  concluding  that  such
schemes  do,  indeed,  act  as  effective  targeting  devices.  But
Ravallion's  analysis,  and  most  of  the  other  literature  on  self-
targeting  schemes,  ignores  the  effect  that  they  can  have  on
intrahousehold  allocation,  as  we  shall  see  in  Sectiot,  5.
4.  INDICATOR  TARGETING  AND  INTRAHOUSEHOLD  ALLOCATION
The  simple  analysis  of  indicator  targeting,  as  conducted,  for
example,  in  Kanbur  (1987),  is  in  terms  of  lump  sum  transfers  to
individuals  with  different  values  of  an  indicator  variable  (e.g.,
region  or  landholding).  All  individuals  with  the  same  indicator  value
are  treated  identically,  since,  ex hypothesi,  there  is  no  other
information  to  differentiate  between  them. Un  this  assumption,  Kanbur
(1987)  derives  leakage  minimizing  rules  based  on  statistical
information  derived,  for  example,  from  sample  surveys.  Individual
incentive  effects  are  ignored  in  the  simple  analysis.  Kanbur  and  Keen
(1990)  show  how  the  rules  are  modified  when  labor  supply  is  elastic,
so  that  incentive  effects  matter  and  the  intervention  itself  changes
the  distribution  of  pre-intervention  income.
Consider  now  the  assumptions  underlying  indicator  targeting  in
light  of  the  literature  on  intrahousehold  allocation.  Suppose  the
indicator  variable  is  such  that  not  all  members  of  the  household  have-7-
the  same  indicator  value,  e.g.,  when  a  program  screens  by  age  or  by
gender.  The  assumption  of  lump  sum  transfers  to  individuals  is  then
seen  to  be  making  an  assumption  about  the  nature  of  intrahouseiold
allocation.  Is  it  that  the  individual  who  receives  the  transfer  gets
to  keep  it? How  might  we  rationalize  this? Certainly  not  in  terms  of
a "common  preference"  model  of  the  household,  one  of  whose
implications  is  that  all  household  resources  are  first  aggregated  into
a  common  pool  and  then  reallocated,  so  that  the  marginal  recipient  of
the  transfer  will,  in  the  final  analysis,  only  benefit  partially.
Such  an  argument  is  valid  even  if  individual-level  incentive  effects
are  taken  into  account.  This  is  an  incentive  effect  of  a  different
sort,  to  do  with  reallocations  among  groupings  of  individuals  who  have
different  values  of  the  indicator  variable  being  used.
Suppose  now  that  the  indicator  variable  is  such  that,  by
definition,  all  members  of  a  household  must  have  the  same  value,  e.g.,
region  of  residence  or  crop/tenure  group.  What  does  the  assumption  of
equal  lump  sum  transfer  now  mean? It  means  that  every  member  of  the
household  receives  the  same  transfer.  But  how  is  this  effected?  The
slightest  reflection  on  design  and  implementation  issues  will  reveal
that  this  assumption  cannot  possibly  be  maintained  in  terms  of
administrators  actually  ensuring  an  equal  transfer  to  each  member  of  a
household.  And,  in  any  case,  there  is  the  issue  of  intrahousehold
reallocation  after  the  equal  transfers  take  place. If  the  transfer  in
practice  is  effected  through  the  head  of  household,  say,  then  the-8-
assumption  of  equal  transfer  to  all  members  of  the  household  implies  a
model  of introhousehold  allocation  which  may  or  m-y  not  be  justified.
In  any  event,  what  is  clear  is  that  the  analysis  of  indicator
targeting  cannot  proceed  without  a  well  articulated  view  of  how  a
household  allocates  resources  to  its  members.  As  Haddad  and  Kanbur
(1991a)  show,  whether  or  not  intrahousehold  reallocations  take
place-and  their  exact  nature--can  make  a  big  difference  to  who  ends
up  benefitting  from  a  program  that  relies  on  indicators  to  target
transfers.
5.  SELF-TARGETING  MECHANISMS  AND  INTRAHOUSEHOLD  BARGAINING
Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990b)  present  a  simple  model  of
intrahousehold  bargaining  whose  object  is  to  relite  the  gains  from
cooopration,  and  the  outside  options,  to  agricultural  production
possibilities.  In  that  model,  there  are  two  individuals,  each  with
access  to  a  production  function  that  produces  output  as  the  result  of
two  task  inputs.  There  is  comparative  advantage  in  the  tasks,  so  it
pays  to  cooperate  and  specialize  in  tasks. But  how  are  the  gains  from
cooperation  to  be  divided?  Suppose  that  the  fallback  option  for  each
individual  is  identified  with  the  outcome  of  working  alone.  The
individua.  with  absolute  advantage  thus  has  a  better  fallback  option
and,  if  we  interpret  this  as  a  threat  point  of  a  Nash  bargain,  he  will
get  the  higher  share  of  the  cooperative  output.  There  is,  therefore,
intrahousehold  inequality.-9-
Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990b,c)  trace  out  the  implications  of  this
model  as  productivity  of  the  two  individuals  increases  so  that  the
household  as  a  whole  is  better  off. But  what  does  this  model  imply
for  the  effectiveness  of  self-targeting  mechanisms,  such  as  the
Employment  Guarantee  Scheme?  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1991b)  present  a
simple  analysis  which  is  nevertheless  illuminating.
Consider  the  case  where  total  cooperative  output  is  giveln  by  x
and  the  allocation  of  each  individual  is  x 1 and  x 2. Let  the  threat
points  be  S,  and  S.,  defined  by  output  when  the  two  individuals  work
on  their  own. Suppose  that  S,  S,,  so  that,  under  the  axioms  of  Nash
bargaining,  x 1 >  x 2. Now,  suppose  that  the  government  introduces  a
scheme  that  guarantees  an  income  of  W. How  will  this  affect
intrahousehold  inequality,  and,  in  particular,  the  well-being  of  the
less  well  off  individual?  For  W  ￿  S,,  of  course,  there  is  no  effect
whatsoever.  But  when  W  >  S 2, W  becomes  the  threat  point  of  individual
fl  *.J-..1  6LL-  *..**..1  OL  ... Ji-le  Ii  L  b1  rY  jjj9
L.  UIlUCi  tlIIC  UsuaI  uutI  u  1e  Of  Ns  Vh4iIIiy,  Lnererore,  if W <  x2,
then  an increase  in  W  will  increase  x2 and decrease x1,  even though
the  guarantee  is  not  taken  ug. As  W increases  to  S,,  both  threat
pu;iiLb  tLeI.uUi  e qu!' a-,u  tihere  is  perfect  equaiity.  ror  w  > 4x, bOth
individuals  will  move to  the  guarantee  scheme.  What is  remarkable  is
that,  even  before  this  point,  the  scheme  has  a long  reach-it
equalizes  intrahousehold  allocation  by  altering  outside  options.
Of  course,  the  credibility  of  the  guarantee  is  at  the  heart  of
the  matter,  and  this  brings  the  issue  back  to  some  of  the  policy
debates  on  employment  rationing  of  employment  guarantee  schemes-10-
(Ravallion  1990).  With  rationing,  the  guarantee  is  not  credible,  and
will  not  have  its  full  effect  on  intrahousehold  allocation.  The
analysis  of  interactions  between  intrahousehold  allocation  and  self-
targeting  schemes  thus  stands  cut  as  a  potentiallh  fruitful  topic  for
theoretical  and  empirical  research.  A  start  is  made  in  this  direction
in  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1991b).
6.  FURTHER  RESEARCH
We  hope  that  the  juxtaposition  of  the  two  literatures  that  is
attempted  here  will  serve  to  increase  the  interaction  between  them.
Such  cross-fertilization  has  already  begun,  but  a  host  of  interesting
theoretical,  empirical,  and  policy  questions  suggest  themselves.
Among  these:  How  are  conventional  rules  for  indicator  targeting
modified  with  different  intrahousehold  allocation  mechanisms?  How  far
wrong  can  one  go  in  targeting  by  simply  assuming  that  intrahousehold
inequality  does  not  exist,  when,  in  fact,  it  does?  What  sort  of
intrahousehold  information  should  be  collected  to  best  aid  targeting?
How  do  the  "bargaining"  versus  "common  preference"  views  of  the
household  influence  our  evaluation  of  alternative  transfer  programs?
In  particular,  what  is  the  quantitative  significance  of  the  "long
reach"  of  guarantee  and  self-targeting  mechanisms,  through  their
effect  on  bargaining  threat  points,  even  when  no  household  member
actually  participates  in  the  scheme?-11-
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